INTRODUCTION
Let me begin by recounting two facts.
Michael VERTIN 1° For the past few years one of my academic responsibilities has been to conduct an undergraduate course entitled "Philosophy of Religion". Until recently 1 labored under the difficulty of not having found a really adequate approach to several of the issues treated in this course, a difficulty typically reflected in the students' reactions to my discussion of evil: while admiring my approach for its rigor, many students found it "too abstract", "too theoretical", "Iacking concreteness". Still more precise1y, for at least a few it was "insufficiently religious" or even "insufficiently Christian".
2° At a 1970 congress of scholars interested in the work of Bernard Lonergan, the philosophy-of-God that had been outlined by Lonergan in chapter nineteen of his book INSIGHT 1 was subjected to severe criticism. 2 The critics, focussing mainly on the account of God's existence and attributes, accused Lonergan of inadequacy for making no appeal to the theist's concrete context, the context of re1igious experience. This objection occasioned a later response in which Lonergan agreed that an adequate phi10sophy-of-God -and, all the more, an adequate theo10gy -must be based upon religious experience ; and he went on at sorne length ta deve10p his notion of this relationship.l Now, it recently occurred to me that Lonergan's later explanation of the characteristics and relationship of religion, philosophy-of-God, and theology provides the most adequate framework yet available for treating, among other issues, the problems of evil. At least to my knowledge, however, little work had been done to exploit that explanation in this area -i.e., to develop in explicit and detailed fashion an updated "tract on evil". Consequently, 1 began attempting on my own to determine just what the shape of such a treatment might be; and to the extent that this allowed me to offer a somewhat revised consideration of evil in my most recent philosophy course, 1 found that the students' earlier complaints tended to dissolve. ln this article, then, 1 should like to sketch the results of my rough and preliminary effort at revising the traditional treatment of evil. Specifically, my aim is fivefold: (i) to delineate in cursory fashion the problems that are posed for human intelligence, reflection, and deliberation by the fact of evil; (ii) to describe a first approach to meeting those problems; (iii) to recall Bernard Lonergan's mature account of the characteristics and relationship of religion, philosophy-of-God, and theology; and (iv & v) to outline, in two steps, a second approach to the problems of evil, an approach suggested by Lonergan's account. 4
EVIL: THE FACT AND THE PROBLEMS

A. The Fact of Evil
An individual need not be especially perceptive in order to be aware that reality is not perfect. There are the anomalies and breakdowns of nature: earthquakes and tornadoes, floods and droughts, physical and mental illnesses, birth defects and death. There are the moral failures on the part of other persons, failures to will what ought to be willed and to avoid willing what ought not to be willed. And, most proximate if not always most readily admitted, there are the major and minor aberrations in one's own pattern of choices.
Nor is this aIl. For besides natural faults and the moral faults of others and of oneself, there is the suffering that these bring in their wake. There is the pain of one injured in a landslide and the grief of one whose ehild has died of leukemia. There is the agony of one subjeeted to physieal torture and the frustration of one subjected to racial discrimination. And there is the eharaeter deformation undergone by one who lies and cheats, with a heightening of his tendeney to perform further such acts.
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972, esp. pp. 101-124; and Lonergan's comments during the fifth question session of the Lonergan Workshop at Boston College, June 17-21, 1974, pp. 15-16 of the typescript made from the tape (available at the Lonergan Centre, Regis College, Toronto). 4. 1 must add two qualifications. First, with the exception of its third section, this article is not intended to be mainly an exposition of Lonergan's own views. It is obvious that Lonergan is by far the most dominant of my sources, but my overriding aim here is systematic rather than exegetical; and, save for that third section, the positions which 1 express are mine and not necessarily his. Secondly, the article is intended to spell out the general relationship of the problems of evi!, on the one hand, and various approaches to them, on the other, but by no means to portray exhaustive\y either those problems or those approaches. This emphasis on breadth rather than depth means that certain topies perhaps quite familiar to individual readers are treated either in very incomplete fashion or not at ail, a feature which 1 hope will not be found unduly distracting.
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In short, if we label natural faults, moral faulls (others' and one's own), and one's consequent suffering "evil", we must say not only that ev il is a fact but that it is one of the most obvious and striking features of the topography of reality, j B. The Problems of Evi/ Let us use the term "problem" to na me a question whose answer has not as yet been clearly and unambiguously determined. Again, let us use the term "God" to name a supreme being, the ultimate object of philosophical inquiry and/or of religious devotion. 6 Finally, let us use the term "contradictory" as a substantive to designate something opposed so radically to something el se as to exclude totally the latter. (Thus, e.g., untruth is the contradictory of truth.) 7 Now, if one posits that evil really exists, that evil is to be understood as the contradictory of good, and that God really exists, then one is confronted with two problems that may aptly be labelled "the problems of God" : (1) How is God to be understood? 8 (2) How ought God be responded to? And whatever the suggested answers to the first (and key) question, one answer that is inadmissible is that God is to be understood as both all-powerful 9 and all-good. For if evil is the contradictory of good, then God must be at least either incapable of excluding his contradictory 5. Rather than beginning with an exp/ana/ory notion of evil, in thi, section 1 have attempted merelv to e\aborate a simple descriptive notion of evil: the task of explanation remain; to be done. (On the distinction between description and explanation, see LOI'FRC;.AI', INSIGHT, e,p. pp. 291-92. Cf. pp. 10-13.) This strikes me as the preferable way of approaching the present topic, given the confusing variety of explanatory notions of evil that have been proposed during the long history of reflection on iL 1 suggest the following (at least rough) terminological parallels: my "moral fault", Aquinas' "ma/um cu/pae", and Lonergan's "basic sin"; my "suffering consequent on moral l'ault", Aquinas' "ma/um paenae", and Lonergan's "moral evil"; and my "natural fault and suffering consequent on it", Aquinas' "ma/um na/Urae", and Lonergan's "physical evil". (Sec AQI:INAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, l, qq. 48-49, and LONIRGAN, INSIGHT, pp. 666-68.) My own further distinctions of '"moral fault" Lnto '"one's own" and "others" and of "suffering consequent on moral fault" into "one's suffering consequent on onc's own moral fault" and "one's suffering consequent on others' moral fault" will, when taken with the previous distinctions, facilitate precise consideration of the question of the concrete relationship of one's total suffering and one's own moral faul!. (See below, Section Tl.) 6. 1 speak broadly of "a supreme being, the ultimate object of philosophical inquiry and/or of religious devotion" in an effort ta hep my initial discussion open to persons of as many different basic persuasions as possible, both philosophical and religious. The expression, however, is not wlthout its ambiguities; and therefore let the following points be understood: (1) My "supreme being" is taken to be uniquely supreme, not just one of two or more. (2) It is understood to be not merely the greatest of whatever beings anyone (c.g., even a professed atheist) might assert actually to exist; rather, it is taken as having specifically divine characteristics. (3) To speak of the supreme being as '"an object" is not ln imply that it might not also be fundamentally a conscious subjcct (or even, as in the Christian theological tradition, trisubjective). (4) 1 am not unaware of (and in fact, whcn speaking more exactly, quite agree with) the Thomist aversion to characterizing the divine as "a" being.
7. See below, n. 15. H. In its full form, this question really is twofold: How is God to be understood, and is that understanding true? The shorter form of the question, however, illustratcs and emphasizes the general point that in the treatment of that which is (ta ken as) fac! it is UNDERSTANDING that is at a premium: the question of that understanding's truth, whiJe by no means unimportant and of course not ignored, is not the characteristic question of the inquiry. from the cosmos, and thus not all-powerful, or such that evil is not his contradictory, and thus not all-good.
If, on the other hand, one posits that God really exists, that God is to be understood as both all-powerful and all-good, and that evil really exists, then one is confronted with two problems that may aptly be labelled "the problems of evil" : (1) How is evil to be understood? 10 (2) How ought evil be responded to? And whatever the suggested answers to the first (and key) question, one answer that is inadmissible is that evil is to be understood as the contradictory of good. For if God is ail·· powerful, then he excludes his contradictory from the cosmos; so that if, in addition, he is all-good, then evil cannot be the contradictory of goOd. 11
Our concern in this article is not with the problems of God, as we have characterized them, but rather with the problems of evil. That is to say, although sorne would challenge the adequacy of such a course,12 we mean to take it as given that God really exists and is both all-powerful and all-good, and to con si der the fact of evil within the parameters dictated by those suppositions. And thus our problems take the following specifie form:
(1) How is evil -natural fault, moral fault, and consequent suffering -to be understood as other than the contradictory of good?
(2) How, in the light of the foregoing, ought evil be responded to?
9. Though they are sometimes distinguished in discussions of the present sort, in this paper we take "allpowerful" (or "omnipotent") to include "all-knowing" (or "omniscient"); for it seems that a God who did not "know ail things" would in an important way be unable to "do ail things". To say that Gad is omnipotent does not, of course, mean that he is literally able to "do ail things", if that expression be ta ken to include, e.g., creating square circles or willing himself out of existence; fOl no/ to be able ta do such things is a perfection rather than a limitation. Rcprinted in Nelson Pike, ed., GOD AND EVIL, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964 . . pp. 46-60.) 10. In its full form, this question really is twofold: How is evil to be understood, and is that understanding true') (See above, n. 8.) II. In our view, the heart of the God/evil problem-complexu5. may be expressed concisely by stating that it is inconsis/en/ to hold ail four of the following positions at the same time: a) God -a supreme being -really exists. b) God is to he understood as both all-powerful and all-good. c) Evil -nalural fault, moral fault, and consequent suffering -really exists.
dl Evil is to he understood as the contradictory of good. The question "How is X to be understood?" breaks down into three subquestions: "WHAT is X?", "HOW does X come to be?", and "WHY does X come to be?" 13 Thus, the complex response of traditional or "older" philosophy-ofGod 14 to the question "How is evil to be understood as other than the contradictory of good?" may be presented as a reply to three sub-questions with regard to each of the following: moral faults, one's suffering l'rom moral faults, and natural faults and one's suffering from them.
First, then, WHA T are moral faults? They are privations of right choices. In the broad sense a privation is sim ply the absence of some positive factor in a thing and thus is a somewhat weaker opposition than is a contradiction: From the explanatory standpoint cold, silence, and darkness are not positive factors but the absences of heat, sound, and light, respectively.15 In the strict sense, however, a privation is the 13. These three questions, of course, regard X's formai, efficient, and final causes. 14. The "tradition" here indicated is, broadly, the Aristotelian-Thomist one. .) The listing of these works together occasions a further -and quite important -point, however, and to make that point wc anticipatc part of our later discussion. One may differentiate three progressively-Iess-abstract, progressively-more-adequate ways of doing philosophy-of-God: (1) one which does not explicitly take aceount of the eonscious subject at ail: (2) one which explicitly takes account of the conseious subject but merely as intellectual; and (3) one which explicitly takes account of the eonscious subject not merely as intellectual but also as moral and especially as religious. The first way is illustrated by the approaches of most Neo-Thomists: sec, for example, D.J.B. HAWKINS, THE ESSENTIALS OF THEJSM, New York: Sheed & Ward. 1949. The second way is illustrated by the approach of Lonergan in chapter nineteen oflNSIGHT. And the third way is illustrated by the approach of Lonergan in his more rccent works, such as METHOD IN THEOLOGY. Now, the first two ways may be grouped together over against the third, inasmueh as the former do not consider the conscious subjeet as religious, while the latter docs: and it is upon this difference that LONERGAN lays the most emphasis in PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY, the work which provided the initial inspiration for the present paper. It is in that work that he designates the third a pproach as "newer" philosophy-of-God. What, then, of the differenee between the first two approaehes? In PHJLOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY, Lonergan tends on occasion (see, e.g., p. 13) to assimilate the second approach to the first, which he designates as "older" philosophy-of-God; and this is the practice which, in ordcr to focus attention on the other difference, we adopt in this paper. Thus, any philosophy-of-God which does not explicitly take account of the conscious subjeet as religious is "older". Moreovcr, wc do not distinguish sharply between the first and the second approaches in our present formulation of the position of "older" philosophy-of-God on evil. The perceptive reader, however, will not lose sight of the fact that both in general and as regards the particular topic of evil the first approach manifests the characteristic -and eventually somewhat negatively assessed -features of "older" philosophy-ofGod much more fully than the second approach does, and that the significance of the differences which make the second approach much closer to the most adequate -third -approach is by no means negligible. 15. "Philosophy ... distinguishes four types of opposition: first, the opposition of contradiction, which is the most radical, in which one of the terms automatically excludes the other : not-man as opposed to man; second, the opposition of privalion, which allows the common clement of both terms to suhsist, but destroys a generic quality possessed by one of them: in man, blindness destroys sight, and in an absence of not just any positive factor but rather of one that ought to be present: blindness in a human being is a privation, though blindness in a stone is not. It is in the latter -strict -sense that moral faults are privations: they are inappropriate defects of will, failures to choose what is morally mandated and to avoid choosing what is morally prohibited.
HOW do moral faults arise? The issue here is not so much efficient causality as deficient causality. Moral faults, in approp ria te "nothings" at the levc\ of human voluntary operation, are due entirely to man: they come about fundamentally because of bad will, a more radical "nothing" at the level of human voluntary disposition. Gad neither directly nor indirectly wills moral faults but merely permits them.
WHY do moral faults arise? Ultimately, the answer to this question is that there is no answer. There may be excuses of ignorance, passion, or habit, and there may be mitigating circumstances of temperament, age, or social milieu; but properly speaking there are no reasons for moral faults. For moral faults are precisely those non-events which are characterized not by having reasons but by having no reasons, not by making sense but by making no sense whatsoever. However, they are permitted by God out of respect for human freedom, a respect that militates against divine intervention even when that freedom is abused.
Secondly, WHAT is one's suffering from moral faults?
It is a privation. Though pain, sorrow, frustration, a heightened tendency to moral fault, etc., are surely not without descriptive reality, in the explanatory order they, Iike cold, silence, and darkness, are not positive but negative : they are the absences of factors required for one's physical and/or psycho-spiritual wholeness, integrity, well-being.
HOW does one's suffering from moral faults come about? Obviously, it arises directly from the moral faults themsc\ves. And it arises indirectly from (a) the human will whence those moral faults arise and (b) the divine will, since God, though neither directly nor indirectly willing the moral faults but merc\y permitting them, nevertheless wills that suffering follow on them.
WHY does one's suffering from moral faults arise? Insofar as it cornes about directly from moral faults and indirectly from the human will, one's suffering from moral faults has no more reason than the faults themselves do -that is to say, none at ail. But insofar as it arises indirectly from the divine will, one 's suffering from moral faults has the character of punishment -fundamentally, retribution for the faults themselves.
Thirdly, WHA Tare natural faults and one' s sufJering from them? They are privations and their privative consequences. 1 n the explanatory if not the descriptive order, so-called natural disasters, disease, decay, death, and the suffering that follows abject black destroys white, assuming that black is not taken ta be a colour, as it is for a painter, but as the privation of ail colour, as it is for the physicist; third. the opposition of contrariety as betwcen two qualities of the same generic type, such as red and green; and fourth. the opposition of relation . . the weakest of ail, which does not necessarily involve a lack in either of the Iwo terms -e.g., the relations of equality or similarity ... " (Charles JOlfR'-iLT. THE MEANING OF EVIL. pp. 37-38. Cf ARISTOTU, METAPHYSICS, V, 10, & X, 4; and AQLI'iAS, META., V, n" 922). 20 on them are the often-progressive absences of positive factors, factors that are necessary for the harmony, health, and perceived well-being of this or that HOW do natural faults and one's suffering from them come about? They are indirectly willed by God: he wills them insofar as he directly wills the entire cosmic arder of which the y are parts, WHY do natural faults and one's suffering from them arise? They are for the good of the cosmic order as a whole, That which from the restricted viewpoint of this or that particular thing is but a defect is, from the universal viewpoint of the co smic order as a who1e, a contribution to the perfection of that whole, su ch that to eliminate the particular defect would be to eliminate a certain amount of cosmic perfection. Thus, somewhat as moments of silence are part of the integral beauty of a symphony, so natural faults and one's suffering from them are part of the integral splendor of the cosmos; or, again, somewhat as pruning a tree occasions the devc10pment of better fruit, so natural faults and one's suffering from them occasion the development of su ch virtues as courage, perseverance, and kindness.
The reply of tradition al philosophy-of-God 16 to the question "How, in the light of the foregoing, ought evil be responded to?" may be summarized in three steps. First, one should strive to eliminate one's moral faults. Secondly, one's suffering from moral faults, as punishment for the faults themselves, should be willingly accepted. Thirdly, natural faults and one's suffering l'rom them should be eliminated insofar as possible and willingly accepted insofar as such elimination is not possible, ail as contributions to cosmic perfection.
B. Merits and Diffieu/ties
As regards content, perhaps the principal merit of traditional philosophy-ofGod in its treatment of the problems of evil is the thoroughness with which it exploits the notion of privation. By understanding the various forms of evil not as positive factors but rather as the absences of positive factors which ought to be present, traditional philosophy-of-God clearly distinguishes evil from good without -as would be inconsistent with the suppositions of God's real existence, omnipotence, and all-goodness -making evil the contradictory of good (and thus of God).
At the same time, the content of that treatment is not without significant difficulties. Let us consider two areas.
First, it is difficult to understand how one's suffering from moral faults could be punishment for moral faults. For it is not obvious even in principle either that an allpowerful God would be bound to require punishment or that an all-good God would desire il. Again, even if the necessity of punishment for moral faults be granted, the frequent (and frequently gross) disproportion between one's actual suffering from 16, Strictly speaking, the reply is not that oftraditionalphilosophy-of-Godbut rather oftraditional nalural ethic.\' FOLLOWING ON philosophy-of-God (and, as weil, on philosophy-of-man), Here in the text we makc this mild distortion in order to stress the real solidarity of practical with theoretical considerations (or, in Lonergan's terms, of the fourlh level of consciousness .... ith the first thrcc) on the part of the conscious subjecL And on the solidarity of practical considerations in anothcr line, see below, n. 30, moral faults -one's own and others' -and one's own moral faults makes quite untenable the notion that that suffering is an all-powerful and all-good God's punishment for one's own faults. For the relatively innocent (most obviously, children) often suffer much, and the relatively guilty often suffer tittle and, indeed, even flourish. 17 Nor is it ultimately any less mind-boggling to suggest that God often punishes the innocent instead of the guilty, though in such a wa y that the suffering which may outweigh the guilt of some individual never outweighs the guilt of his group (or, in the timit, mankind) as a whole. 18 And, finally, insofar as one's suffering from moral faults cannot be understood simply as punishment for moral faults, the appropriateness of the practical admonition to accept that suffering willingly falls open to challenge.
Secondly, it is difficult to understand how natural faults and one's suffering from them could be necessary contributions to the perfection of the cosmos. For it is not obvious even in principle that an all-powerful God would be unable to cause a finite material cosmos at least equal in perfection to the present one but without natural faults and consequent suffering. Moreover, even if it be granted that in a finite mate rial cosmos natural faults and consequent suffering are necessary to the perfection of the whole, it is not obvious even in principle that an all-good God would desire to cause such a cosmos rather than none at aIl. Again, even if both preceding points be granted, it is still not clear that the natural defects and consequent suffering with which the present cosmos is actually shot through are not ~ell beyond the minimum to which an all-powerful God would be bound and which an all-good God would choose. And, finally, insofar as natural faults and one's suffering from them cannot be understood simply as contributions to cosmic perfection, the appropriateness of the practical admonition to accept willingly whatever cannot be eliminated falls open to challenge. 
-------------------PHILOSOPHY-OF-GOD, THEOLOGY, AND THE PROBLEMS OF [VIL
As regards method, perhaps the principal merit of traditional philosophy-ofGod in its treatment of the problems of evil is its logical rigor. It systematically seeks clarity in its concepts, consistency in its contentions, and exhaustiveness in its arguments; and if in this or that respect it does not completely achieve those goals, still the direction of its tendency is never in doubt.
On the other hand, traditional philosophy-of-God has two serious deficiencies in its method. First, its emphasis upon logical rigor is not only vigorous but also virtually exclusive: in its close attention to contents ofthought it t'ails to advert to the concrete conscious subject who is the thinker and thus to take account of how his subjective disposition can affect his response. 19 Hence the not untypical student lament, forcefully if not altogether accurately expressed, "This is too philosophical '" The second deficiency is inherent to philosophy-of-God as such : there is a systematic prescinding from the contents of formai divine revelation. While quite appropriate to philosophy-of-God as distinct from theology, this restriction can appear as artificial and even frustrating for the student who, as a -say -Christian believer, is interested in bringing ail of his personal reflective resources to bear upon the problems of evil; and thus he will, not surprisingly, complain about the "nonreligious" character of the treatment.
III. LONERGAN ON RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY-OF-GOD. AND THEOLOGY
The preceding section of this article outlined the approach of traditional philosophy-of-God to the problems posed for human intelligence, reflection, and deliberation by the fact of evil, along with the merits and difficulties of that approach. The present section describes Bernard Lonergan's mature view of the characteristics and relationship of religion, philosophy-of-God, and theology; and the two subsequent sections, drawing out the implications of that view, will sketch the two stages of an alternative approach to the problems of evil.
A. Religion
We may review Lonergan's notion of religion by considering his accounts of, in turn, two kinds of disciplinary inquiry,2° three kinds of conversion,2' and two aspects of religion Y The first kind of disciplinary inquiry adopts the static, immobile viewpoint of Jogie. It concerns itself exdusively with real and/or mental objects, expresses the se in terms of abstract concepts, and then seeks to determine the mutual relations of those 19 . Rccall that this indictment applies to thefirst way of "older" philosophy-of-God far more than to the second way. See above, n. 14. 23 concepts within a fixed conceptual system. Its ideal is conceptual c1arity; and it is likely to main tain that the pathway to genuine objectivity is careful looking and rigorous inferring. It is aptly illustrated by, among other things, traditional or "older" philosophy in general and philosophy-of-God in particular.
The second kind of disciplinary inquiry, by contrast, adopts the dynamic, moving viewpoint of method. It concerns itself not merely with real and/or mental objects but also with the dispositions, intentions, and operations of the conscious subject. It employs concrete symbols as weil as abstract concepts; and it seeks not merely to relate these to each other within the static systems which they may comprise but also to chart the process from one static system to the next within a dynamic system, a system on the move, a system whose developmental structure is fundamentally a function of the ever-expanding horizon of the conscious subject himself. Its ideal is not just conceptual c1arity but, more broadly, conscious and intentional adequacy; and it holds that the pathway to genuine objectivity is, most basically, nothing other than authentic subjectivity -experiencing that is attentive, understanding that is intelligent, judging that is reasonable, deciding that is responsible. Now, when undertaken with regard to the conscious subject himself, the second kind of disciplinary inquiry -much to be preferred, by reason of its greater adequacy -reveals the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversIOn. ln general, a conversion is a radical transformation of the subject's consciousness, resulting in a new horizon that is not just a development from, but rather involves a repudiation of, characteristic features of the subject's old horizon.
The subject who has undergone intel/ectual conversion has outgrown the ocular myth that the activity of knowing is fundamentally like seeing, that objectivity results exactly from seeing what is there and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is the "already out there now" waiting to be seen. Through appropriation of his own cognitional performance, he has come to the recognition that the activity of knowing is a formally-dynamic compound of activities of experiencing, understanding, and judging, that cognitional objectivity results exactly from experiencing attentively, understanding intelligently, and judging reasonably, and that the real is the compound content that is thus cognitionally achieved.
The subject who has undergone moral conversion has made the discovery that in large part it is he himself who by the choices he makes today determines the self he will be tomorrow, and in light of that discovery has undertaken to replace selfish satisfactions with self-transcending values as the standards to which he refers in deciding and choosing.
And the subject who has undergone religious conversion is in a state of total selfsurrender, of complete self-transcendence, that can best be characterized as unrestricted being-in-Iove. Unrestricted being-in-Iove is a dynamic state that, though it can and indeed demands to be expressed and fostered by deliberate acts, is perceived as fundamentally prior to those acts, a given, a giftY It brings deep joy and profound 23 . On the distinction between the gift as offered and the gift as accepted. see below. n. 43.
PHILOSOPHY-OF-GOD. THEOLOGY. A'iD THE PROBLEMS OF EVII
peace. And it reveals vital, social, cultural, and personal values not previously esteemed. 24 But of itself it does not involve knowledge in the strict sense: it stands as the major exception to the dictum that nothing is loved that is not already known, for who it is that is loved is not yet known ; and thus there remains a conscious pressure in this regard to inquire and understand, to reflect and judge, and, perhaps, to believe. Such a cognitional effort, however, goes forward within a context that is dominated by the fact of the love itself, so that ail conclusions that would impugn the unrestricted lovability of the beloved are virtually if not formally ruled out, and this even in advance, as it were, of any inquiry. The effort is not to determine whether there is a beloved who is unrestrictedly lovable, for this is not at ail in doubt; rather, it is to determine just who that unrestrictedly lovable be10ved is, and ultimately to resolve ail other issues in that light. 25 The distinction between the experience of unrestricted being-in-Iove and the public body of knowledge, belief, and practice to which one may turn in cognitionally elaborating that experience is the distinction between two aspects of religion. Unrestricted being-in-Iove is the inner word, the prior word, that is religious experience. It pertains to the world of immediacy: it is the unmediated experience of unbounded love for the mysterious beloved. Of itself, it is highly unspecified in character and th us possesses a fundamental similarity from one group, culture, and age to the next. 26 On the other hand, the public body of knowledge, be1ief, and practice is the outer word, the outwardly spoken word, that is religious tradition. lt pertains to the worlds mediated by meaning: basically, it would presume to name the mysterious beloved. Religious traditions arise and deve10p in the context of the particular times, places, pers ons, and events that provide the outward occasions of the inward experience ; and thus they are historically conditioned and may vary from one group, culture, and age to the next.
The foregoing distinction, already important for the phenomenologist of religion, has an added significance for the Christian theologianY For the latter, the distinction between the fundamentally transcultural religious experience and the historically conditioned religious tradition is the distinction between the inner core and the outer manifestation of God's gift of his love. The inner core, the inward gift,
The apprehension of values tha! is an aspect of unrestricted being-in-Iove is designated by Lonergan as
faith. It is to be distinguished from knowledge in the strict sense, judgment based upon evidcnce whosc sufficiency one grasps personaIly. And it is to be distinguished as weIl from belief, judgment based upon evidence whose sufficiency one grasps not personally but rather through the mediation of one or more other conscious subjects. . Lonergan customarily makes this distinction in expressly theological rather than merely phenomenological terms. In a discussion contex! where one does not wish ID presuppose that others have explicit religious stances (such as would Jus!ify speaking easily of God's gin, etc.). however, the more minimal approach often is useful.
is offered, at least, to ail men; and it is the element common to ail religions. By contrast, the outer manifestation, the outer expression of God's gift ofhis love, is the word of formai divine revelation and summarily the Word who is Jesus Christ; and this is the unique and characteristic element of Christianity. Hence, as cognitionally elaborated (and, subsequently, as practically implemented), the religious experiencf~ of the Christian expressly involves an intersubjective relationship with God as given in Jesus Christ, a feature that makes that experience specifically different from ail other forms of religious experience.
B. Philosophy-of-God and The%gy
Our brief review of Lonergan's notion of religion puts us in position to recall his notions of philosophy-of-God 28 and theology. not merely with objects but also, and more fundamentally, with the conscious subject. Specifically, it is a reflection on the conscious subject's religious experience in terms of its common aspect, the aspect under which the religious experiences of ail conscious subjects are similar. That is to say, it is a reflection on unrestricted beingin-love, the inner word -or, as the Christian theologian expresses it, on the inner core of God's gift of his love. Thus, "newer" philosophy-of-God is theology, taking the latter in the broad sense of "reflection on religion".
Theology in the strict sense -Christian theology -as envisaged by Lonergan likewise proceeds from the dynamic, moving viewpoint of method. Like philosophyof-God it is a reflection on the conscious subject's religious experience; but it considers that experience in terms not merely of its common aspect but also of its specifically Christian aspect. That is to say, it is a reflection both on unrestricted being-in-love, the inner core of God's gift of his love, the inner word, and on Christian revelation, the outer manifestation of the divine gift, the outer word whence the Christian cognitionally elaborates and practically implements his primitive religious experience. Thus theology in part is methodically and performatively, though not logically, solidary with philosophy-of-God: indeed, the former can be viewed as the preserving but perfecting sublation of the latter. JO
IV. EVIL: A SECOND APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS (1)
A. "Newer" Philosophy-of-God on Evi/ "Newer" philosophy-of-God is a reflective explicitation of the ultimate implications of the dynamic structure of the conscious subject who has undergone religious conversionY More exactly, it is a reflective bringing-to-light of what is ultimately implied by inquiry, by reflection, by deliberation, and -most basicallyby unrestricted being-in-love. It uncovers and manifests the performative selfcontradiction in which the subject would be involved, were he to deny that there is an intelligent ground of the universe, a ground that is world-transcending necessary being, the universal moral ground and goal, the unrestrictedly lovable beloved. 32 "Newer" philosophy-of-God thus arrives at a position that includes the affirmations by traditional philosophy-of-God that God really exists and is both all-powerful and all-good. And, as regards evil, this leads to the further affirmation that although evil 30 
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:vtICIIAEL VERTIN really exists 33 it is not the contradictory of good ; and that, in turn, eventually gives rise to the traditional conclusions as to how evil is to be understood and how it ought to be responded to. 34 On the present approach, by contrast with the traditional one, however, both the general affirmations about God and evil and the specific theoretical and practical conclusions about evil are grasped as functions not just of the reasonable but also and more fundamentally of the lovable; and they are maintained not as "merely abstract" but rather as finally implied by the eminently concrete and full-blooded re1igious experience that provides the characteristic tone and color of the subject's entire conscious life. Consequently, though there is no significant advance toward formaI resolution of such theoretical and practical difficulties as those presented by the conclusions that one's suffering from moral faults is punishment for moral faults and that natural faults and one's suffering from them are contributions to the perfection of the cosmos,35 and though these difficulties thus remain as enigmatic as ever, they now are -to use Newman's terminologynot just notionally but really apprehended as at least virtually resolved in such a way as not to be at odds with the real existence, all-powerfulness, and all-goodness of the unrestrictedly lovable beloved.
B. Merils and Diffieullies
With respect to content, "newer" philosophy-of-God retains both the principal merit and the most significant difficulties of tradition al philosophy-of-God in regard to the problems of evil. For in understanding ev il as possessing privative rather than positive reality it distinguishes it c1early from good without making it the contradictory of good and thus transposing the problems of evil into the problems of God. But, on the other hand, it still is confronted with the theoretical and practical difficulties that flow from understanding suffering as punishment and/or a contribution to cosmic perfection. 36
The superiority of "newer" philosophy-of-God over its predecessor in treating the problems of evil derives not from its content but from its method. For inasmuch as it grows out of a reflection on the dynamic structure of the concrete conscious subject, it eliminates the dry, remote, abstract character possessed by the affirmations regarding evil wh en they are reached via the traditional approach. Without in any way sacrificing logical rigor, it manifests those affirmations as escapable only at the price of denying the unrestricted being-in-love that is the conscious subject's most basic dynamic feature; and th us it overcomes the objection that the affirmations are "too philosophical". 28 conscious subject who precisely through reference to that tradition has cognitionally elaborated and practically implemented his primitive religious experience. The discipline in which this deficiency is rectified, however, is not philosophy-of-God, it is Christian theology ; and to a consideration of its stance regarding evil we now turn.
V. EVIL: A SECOND APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS (2) A. Systematic Theology on Evi/ Theology -more exactly, Systematics, in the functionally-differentiated theology that we are prcsupposing 3R -maintains the concrete, dynamic approach of "newcr" philosophy-of-God, sublating the latter's reflective explicitation of primitive unrestrictcd being-in-love, the inner word of God's gift of his love, and complementing it with a reflection on Christian revclation, the outer expression of the divine gift. 39 The theological reply to the question of how evil is to be understood may be indicated briefly by touching three topics : personal sin, original sin, and redemption. 40 Traditional philosophy-of-God understands moral faults basically as being irrational acts, transgressions of the moral order that is discovered by right reason. "Newer" philosophy-of-God takes over that notion but goes on view moral faults more basically as unloving acts, acts in tension with the dynamic thrust of unrestricted loving that underpins the religious subject's conscious life. Theology, in turn, takes over both notions and goes on to specify those unloving acts more precisely as acts tending ultimately toward rejection of God's love offered to men in Jesus Christ; and in this sense it designates moral faults as personal sins. 41 Nor does it view at least a certain amount of suffering from moral faults as surprising: one de serves to be punished for one's sins.
Besides the free, contingent, "ethical" aspect of evil, howevcr, evil as directly or indirectly chosen, ev il as personal sin and deserved punishment, there is the necessary, inherited, "tragic" aspect of evil, evil as given prior to one's choice and thus as somehow beyond one's control; 42 and theology understands this in terms of original sin. Adam 's personal sin has tragic consequences for the entire cosmos, consequences which thus radically qualify the situation in which each individual "born into Adam" exercises his personal freedom. These consequences involve an original state of guilt for ail of Adam's progeny, together with a dynamic inclination to ratify that original state of guiIt by personal sin. They involve a heightening of natural fauIts and one's suffering from them. And though they bring to light a solidarity among men, they specify that solidarity as one in which one person may be required to suffer for the personal sins of another.
Correlative to Adam's sinful act and its cos mie consequences, however, is Christ's redemptive act and ifs cos mie consequences. As Adam 's act of lovelessness has deleterious effects on the situation in which human freedom is exercised, so Christ's act of supreme love has salvific effects on that situation. As in virtue of Adam's sin ail men are originally sinful and inclined toward personal sin, so in virtue of Christ's vicarious suffering ail men are objectively redeemed and given God's gift of unrestricted being-in-love. 4J Thus the concrete conscious subject has not merely the opportunity freely to appropriate and ratify his state of original sin by acceding to his sinful inclination through personal acts of sin but also the opportunity freely to appropriate and ratify his state of objective redemption by accepting God's gift of unrestricted loving through personal acts of Christ-like love. And it is precisely insofar as men thus "put on Christ" that creation as a whole tends toward the Day of the Lord in which not just the "ethical" but also the "tragic" aspect of evil will be eradicated.
The theological reply to the question of how, in the light of the foregoing, evil ought to be responded to is threefold. 44 First, one should strive to eliminate his personal sinning, responding instead to God's gift of love by modelling himself on Christ. Secondly, one should willingly accept that suffering which he perceives to be deserved for his personal sins, the "ethical" aspect of suffering. 45 Thirdly, one should willingly accept as weil that suffering which he does not perceive to be deserved for 43 . Il is a theological position that every person is given grace sufficient for salvation, but that every person is free to accept or reject that gifl. (See, e.g., METHOD IN THEOLOGY, pp. 108-109, and PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY, pp. 18-20,36-38.) Now, the metaphysical distinction between grace as given, operative grace, and grace as accepted, cooperative grace, may be translated into the categories of intentionality analysis as the distinction between the two moments of religious conversion: religious conversion as it is defined and as il is achieved, or, again, as il is recognized and as it is accepted. (See METHOD IN THEOLOGY, pp. 241, 283-84, and FOUNDATIONS OF THEOLOGY, pp. 225-26.) It is but stating the traditional theological position in contemporary terms, then, to say that every person is given the divine gift of unrestricted being-in-Iove, with the option of accepting or rejecting that gifl. 44. As natural ethics is solidary with philosophy-of-God, so moral theology is solidary with speculative theology. (Recall above, p. 21, n. 16.) And performatively, at least, these ail come together in the functional specialty that is Systematics. (Cf. above, p. 27, n. 30.) 45. Needless to say. one inclined to conclude tha! his suffering is personally undeserved should consider whether it is indeed sinfulness or perceptiveness that he lacks : the traditional view that the greatest saints are the most keenly aware of their personal sinfulness is a venerable one. On the other hand. it is difficult to maintain tha! absolutely ail suffering is personally deserved, sinee at least the suffering of children is a clear counter-example. Moreover, that position, one of the claims of Job's comforters, appears -if we may play light with the Scriptures for a moment -to be rejected by the most eminent of authorities on the topic! (Sec Job 42: 7ff.) 30 his personal sins, the "tragic" aspect of suffering: he should st rive to endure such suffering as Christ endured it, meeting the evil that is suffering and sin with the good that is love, returning not evil for evil but good for evil and th us transforming the evil into good by making it an occasion for love. 46 
B. Merits and Di/fieu/ties
As to content, theology in its treatment of the problems of evil preserves the chief merit of philosophy-of-God in that regard by understanding evil as privation, 41 But it also makes a considerable contribution of its own by explicitating the Christian revelation that illuminates the way in which fault and suffering are, at a deeper level, sin and punishment and the way in which their positive counterparts are love and redemption. And in this respect it somewhat moderates the incomprehensibility of the "tragic" aspect of one's suffering, the aspect that is beyond one's control, portraying it as a function of solidarity in sin with Adam and as an opportunity for solidarity in vicarious and loving suffering with Christ. N onetheless, this twodirectional invocation of human solidarity does not set the anguishing theoretical difficulties to rest; and mystery remains.
As to method, theology not only is capable of responding to legitimate demands for intellectual rigor, and not only takes account of the conscious subject in the plenitude of his concrete experience, but also gives full regard to the word (Word) of the Christian religious tradition; and thus it considers the problems of evil in the fullest and most complete way normally available for intellectual inquiry in via. And in the same regard, note the complement to our earlier (above, p. 22, n. 18) literary excerpt: "Tell me yourself, 1 challenge you -answer. Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature -that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance -and to round that edifice on its unavenged tears, wou Id you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth." "No, 1 wouldn't consent", said Alyosha softly. "And can you admit the idea that men for whom you are building it would agree to accept their happiness on the foundation of the unexpiated blood of a liule victim ? And accepting it would remain happy for ever1" "No, 1 can't admit it, Brother", said Alyosha suddenly, with flashing eyes. "You saidjust now, is there a being in the whole world who would have the right to forgive and could forgive? But there is a being and He can forgive everything, ail and for ail, because He gave His innocent blood for ail and everything. You have forgotten Him, and on Him is built the edifice, and it is to Him they cry aloud, 'Thou art just, 0 Lord, for Thy ways are revealed.'" (From Fyodor DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV, Book V, Chapter IV.)
